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Abstract—Avionics networks rely on a set of stringent reliability
and safety requirements. In existing deployments, most of these
networks are based on a wired technology, which supports
these requirements. Furthermore, this technology simplifies the
security management of the network since certain assumptions
can be safely made, including the inability of an attacker to
access the network, and the fact that it is almost impossible
for an attacker to introduce a node into the network. The
proposal for Avionics Wireless Networks (AWNs, currently
under consideration by multiple aerospace working groups,
promises a reduction in the complexity of electrical wiring
harness design and fabrication, a reduction in the total weight
of wires, increased customization possibilities, and the capacity
to monitor otherwise inaccessible moving or rotating aircraft
parts such as landing gear and some sections of the aircraft
engines. While providing these benefits, the AWN must ensure
that it provides levels of safety that are at minimum equivalent
to those offered by the wired equivalent. In this paper, we
propose a secure and trusted channel protocol that satisfies
the stated security and operational requirements for an AWN
protocol. There are three main objectives for this protocol.
First, the protocol has to provide the assurance that all
communicating entities can trust each other, and can trust
their internal (secure) software and hardware states. Second,
the protocol has to establish a fair key exchange between all
communicating entities so as to provide a secure channel.
Finally, the third objective is to be efficient for both the
initial start-up of the network and when resuming a session
after a cold and/or warm restart of a node. The proposed
protocol is implemented within a demo AWN, and performance
measurements are presented based on this implementation.
In addition, we formally verify our proposed protocol using
CasperFDR.
1. Introduction
A modern aircraft can be considered as a highly reliable
and mission-critical digital network in the air. The Aircraft
Data Network (ADN) interconnects different aircraft sub-
systems, including flight control, the crew network and the
passenger entertainment network. In recent years investiga-
tions into the feasibility of moving some non-critical net-
works from wired technology to wireless-based technology
have been carried out. Such a network is referred to as an
Avionics Wireless Network (AWN), which is the main focus
of this paper.
Whatever the network deployment topology and the
communication technology that are used, one element is
common: the physical wire that connects two or more
avionics sub-systems. Wiring an aircraft can be costly in
that it includes wiring harness designs, cable fabrication
and the associated cost of additional weight. Furthermore,
to provide dual redundancy, these wires have to connect any
two devices by means of two physically separate paths in the
aircraft. Wires and related connectors potentially represent
2-5 percent of an aircraft’s weight [1]. As the wiring of
an aircraft is a time- and labor-intensive activity, post-
deployment upgrades or installation of new wire routes or
new avionics sub-systems may be costly [2]. As reported by
[1], roughly 30 percent of wires are potential candidates for
wireless substitutes. Therefore, as highlighted in [3], wire-
less solutions have more than reasonable prospects as long
as security, safety and high reliability can be maintained.
Whether an ADN or an AWN is used, the main objec-
tive is to communicate data between aircraft sub-systems
in a secure, reliable and efficient manner. Going wireless
brings its own set of unique challenges, among which a
major one is to ensure the confidentiality and integrity of
communications; any attacker within wireless range of the
AWN can easily eavesdrop and/or (potentially) modify the
exchanged information. To protect against such an attack,
we require a strong, efficient and trustworthy mechanism
to establish secure links between the communicating nodes
in an AWN. Secure channel protocols can be used for this
purpose, and in this paper we propose such a protocol for
AWN environments. In this paper, we are not going to
discuss the wireless jamming attacks. Although they are a
valid threat but they do not directly attack the confidentiality
and integrity of communication channel - wireless jamming
attack is a thread to channel availability. For this reason they
are beyond the scope of this paper.
1.1. Contribution
In this paper, our main goals are to propose a secure
and trusted channel protocol for AWNs, and to compare
its security and performance with several other existing
protocols.
The salient contributions of this paper are as follows:
1) proposing a Secure and Trusted Channel Protocol
(STCP) that along with establishing a secure channel
between the communicating entities (end-points) also
provides security assurance that each end-point is se-
cure and trusted;
2) defining comparison criteria for secure channel proto-
cols along with the related security and performance
analysis;
3) validating the proposed protocol with a formal tool,
CasperFDR and producing an implementation in a real
AWN to enable measurements to be obtained.
1.2. Structure of the Paper
Section 2 briefly presents the rationale behind this paper
and the existing work carried out in the avionics industry (in
the context of AWNs) and secure channel protocols from a
traditional computer security perspective. In section 3, we
look into how a Trusted Platform Module (TPM) can pro-
vide a trusted boot that is then used to assure communication
partners that the device is secure and trustworthy. Section
4 discussed the security comparison criteria and then the
proposed protocol. In section 5, we first analyze the pro-
posed protocol informally, than formally using CasperFDR
and we compare it with different protocols based on the
security comparison criteria previously defined. Finally in
section 6 we present future research directions and conclude
the paper.
2. Rationale and Related Work
In this section, we discuss the rationale behind the pro-
posed protocol and review the existing work in two different
areas: AWNs and Secure Channel Protocols (SCPs).
2.1. Rationale
A Secure Channel Protocol (SCP) by definition provides
either or both of entity authentication and key exchange
between communicating parties (end points). An SCP pre-
serves the confidentiality and integrity of the messages on
the considered channel but not at the end points.
Nevertheless, there can be implicit assurance in the
integrity and security of the end points as described by
ETSI TS 102 412 [4] in the domain of the smart card
industry. This document states that the smart card is a secure
end point under the assumption that it is a tamper-resistant
device. This type of assurance can be extrapolated to other
devices that are implicitly trusted because of offline business
relationships or because of a property of the device itself.
However, for a critical system like avionics it is not just
implicit trust that should be required but also explicit trust
validation, to counter any potential threat. The explicit trust
assurance should be provided by the (aircraft) device that is
participating in the AWN communication. This would build
in an assurance that only secure and trusted devices (explic-
itly trusted devices with per-protocol run assurance) will
participate in the AWN, potentially countering physically
altered devices and/or re-introduction of a decommissioned
device as discussed in [3, 5].
In contrast, in the ADN, the assumption of implicit
assurance might be valid. However, for a robust security
and reliability mechanism an explicit security assurance
mechanism should be considered.
A trusted channel is a secure channel that is crypto-
graphically bounded to the current state of the communi-
cating parties [6]. This state can be a hardware and/or a
software configuration, and ideally it requires a trustworthy
component to validate it is effectively as claimed. Such a
component, in most instances, is a TPM [7] as demonstrated
in [8]–[10]
In an AWN, individual devices will have prior rela-
tionships with each other: in the avionics industry any
system deployment is stringently controlled, regulated and
protected. Therefore, assuming that one single trusted entity
would deploy the AWN environment is as per the avionics
industry’s practice. However, when establishing a secure
channel, individual devices should still ensure that they are
not only communicating with an authenticated device but
also that the current state of this device is secure.
2.2. Related Work on AWN Security Concerns
Security and trust have been subject to some analy-
sis by both the academic community and the industry. A
brief overview of aircraft information security and some
improvements were proposed in [11]. Security assurance
research from airplane production to airplane operation was
presented in [12, 13]. A general discussion of the security
issues related to the aircraft network and aircrafts’ connec-
tivity with the Internet is provided in [14], while [15, 16]
discusses the impact of WSNs (Wireless Sensor Networks)
and related security concerns in aircraft. Security and safety
are intrinsically linked to each other in general and specifi-
cally in the context of the aviation industry [17]–[19]. The
application and impact of cryptography, especially public
key cryptography for avionics networks, was evaluated in
[20].
The management of security and the general deployment
of AWNs based on wireless-as-a-comm-link have been an-
alyzed in [3], which discusses the security and trust chal-
lenges faced by AWNs. In addition, a crucial component that
supports aircraft devices security is the trusted boot process
discussed in [5]. The security, trust and assurance issues
related to the fact of bringing a user device into an aircraft
network are evaluated in [21].
2.3. Related Work on Secure Channel Protocols
In this section, we restrict the discussion to the protocols
that are proposed for general-purpose computing environ-
ments or to those that are used as points of comparison in
the discussions to come.
The concept of trusted channel protocols was proposed
by Gasmi et al. [6] along with the adaptation of the TLS
protocol [22]. Later Armknecht et al. [9] proposed another
adaptation of OpenSSL to accommodate the concept of
trusted channels; similarly, Zhou and Zhang [8] also pro-
posed an SSL-based trusted channel protocol.
In section 5.2, we will compare the proposed STCP
with the existing protocols. These protocols include the
Station-to-Station (STS) protocol [23], the Aziz-Diffie (AD)
protocol [24], the ASPeCT protocol [25], Just-Fast-Keying
(JFK) [26], trusted TLS (T2LS) [6], GlobalPlatform SCP81
[27], the Markantonakis-Mayes (MM) protocol [28], and the
Sirett-Mayes (SM) protocol [29].
This selection of protocols is intentionally broad so as to
include well-established protocols like STS, AD and JFK.
We also include the ASPeCT protocol, which is designed
specifically for mobile networks’ value-added services. Sim-
ilar to our proposal where we require trust assurance during
the protocol run, T2LS meets this as it provides trust assur-
ance, whereas other protocols like SCP81, SM, and MM are
specific to smart cards and are representative embedded low-
power devices. In addition, we have included the secure and
trusted channel protocol, P-STCP [10], which is designed
for resource-restricted and security-sensitive environments,
and has some similar design requirements to those of the
proposed protocol.
3. Trusting a Device (Trusted Boot)
In this section, we discuss how a TPM provides a secure
boot process and how it provides assurance to external
entities that the device is secure and trustworthy.
3.1. Trusted Platform Module
The TPM is a trusted, reliable and tamper-resistant com-
ponent that can provide trustworthy evidence of the state of
a given system on which it is present. The interpretation of
this evidence is neither controlled nor dictated by the TPM
but by the entity receiving and thus assessing it. Trust in
this context can be defined as an expectation that the state
of a system is as it is supposed to be, i.e. secure. Therefore,
in a very simplistic sense a TPM is a trustworthy reporting
agent (witness), not an evaluator or an enforcer of security
policies. In the field of trusted computing, this is referred to
as providing a root of trust on which an inquisitor relies to
validate the current state of a system.
For in-depth discussion of the architecture of TPMs and
their functionality please refer to [7]. In this paper, we focus
on the secure boot process as it is carried out by the TPM
and as discussed in the subsequent section.
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Figure 1. Trusted Platform Boot Sequence (figure from [30])
3.2. Secure Boot (TPM Integrity Measurement Op-
eration)
When a device with a TPM boots up, the first component
to power up is the system BIOS (Basic Input/output System).
On a trusted platform (a platform that contains a TPM), the
boot sequence is initiated by the Core BIOS (i.e. CRTM:
Core Root of Trust Measurement), which first measures its
own integrity. This measurement is stored in PCR01 and it
is later extended to include the integrity measurement of the
rest of the BIOS. The Core BIOS then measures the circuit-
board’s (motherboard) configuration setting2, and this value
is stored in PCR1. After these measurements, the Core BIOS
loads the rest of the code of the BIOS.
The BIOS will subsequently measure the integrity of
the ROM firmware and of the ROM firmware configuration,
storing them in PCR2 and PCR3 respectively. At this stage,
the base configuration of a device is established and the
CRTM will proceed with integrity measurement and loading
of the Operating System (OS).
The CRTM measures the integrity of the “OS Loader
Code”, also termed the Initial Program Loader (IPL), and
1. A Platform Configuration Register (PCR) is a 160-bit (20 bytes) data
element that stores the result of the integrity measurement, which is a
generated hash of a given component (e.g. the BIOS, the operating system,
or an application). A group of PCRs form the integrity matrix. The process
of extending PCR values is as follows: PCRi = Hash(PCR
′
i||X),
where i is the PCR index, PCR
′
i represents the old value stored at index
i, and X is the sequence to be included in the PCR value. “||” indicates the
concatenation of two data elements in the given order. The starting value
of all PCRs is zero.
2. To measure that correct hardware configuration was present at boot
time.
stores the measurement in the relevant PCR. The designated
PCR index is left to the discretion of the OS developers.
Subsequently, the device will execute the “OS Loader Code”
and if successful, the TPM will measure the integrity of the
“OS Code”. After this measurement is made and stored,
the “OS Code” executes. Finally, the relevant software that
initiates its execution will first be subjected to an integrity
measurement, and the resulting value will be stored in a
PCR and then the software will be allowed to execute. This
process is shown in Figure 1, which illustrates the execution
flow and the storage of the integrity measurements.
By creating a chain of integrity measurements, a TPM
provides a trusted and reliable view of the current state of
the system. Any piece of software, whether part of the OS
or an application, has an integrity measurement stored in a
PCR at a particular index.
As discussed above, a TPM does not make any deci-
sions: it only measures, stores, and reports integrity mea-
surements in a secure and reliable manner. When a TPM
reports an integrity measurement, it is recommended that
it generates a signature on the value, thus avoiding replay
and man-in-the-middle attacks [7]. The process by which an
inquisitor can request a device attestation and how a TPM
provides this evidence is discussed in the next section.
Reporting and Attestation Operations. The attestation
process, whether initiated by the relevant external entity
(including human users or other devices) locally or remotely,
involves the generation of a signature by the TPM using
the Attestation Identification Key (AIK) of the (associ-
ated/requested) PCR values [30]. The signature assures the
requesting entity of the validity of the integrity measurement
stored in the PCRs. The choice of the AIK and PCR index
is dependent on the device, OS or application developer.
The signature key and PCR values are stored in a tamper-
resistant memory inside the TPM. Therefore, an attacker
would have to circumvent the tamper-resistant property of
the TPM to impact the outcome of this attestation process.
4. Secure and Trusted Channel Protocol
In this section, we begin the discussion with the security
comparison criteria, followed by the protocol notation, pre-
setup and then the actual protocol proposal. This section
concludes with a discussion of how the secure channel is
re-established if one of the devices is restarted or resets the
protocol.
4.1. Security Comparison Criteria
For a protocol to support the AWN framework, it should
meet, at minimum, the security and operational requirements
listed below:
G1) Mutual Entity Authentication: All nodes in the net-
work should be able to authenticate to each other to
avoid masquerading by a malicious entity.
G2) Asymmetric Architecture: Exchange of certified pub-
lic keys between the entities to facilitate the key gen-
eration and entity authentication process.
G3) Mutual Key Agreement: Communicating parties will
agree on the generation of a key during the protocol
run.
G4) Joint Key Control: Communicating parties will mu-
tually control the generation of new keys to avoid
one party choosing weak keys or predetermining any
portion of the session key.
G5) Key Freshness: The generated key will be fresh to the
protocol session to protect against replay attacks.
G6) Mutual Key Confirmation: Communicating parties
will provide implicit or explicit confirmation that they
have generated the same keys during a protocol run.
G7) Known-Key Security: If a malicious user is able to
obtain the session key of a particular protocol run,
it should not enable him to retrieve long-term secrets
(private keys) or session keys (future and past).
G8) Unknown Key Share Resilience: In the event of an
unknown key share attack, an entity X believes that it
has shared a key with Y , where the entity Y mistakenly
believes that it has shared the key with entity Z 6= X .
Proposed protocols should adequately protect against
this attack.
G9) Key Compromise Impersonation (KCI) Resilience: If
a malicious user retrieves the long-term key of an entity
Y , it will enable him to impersonate Y . Nevertheless,
key compromise should not enable him to impersonate
other entities to Y [31].
G10) Perfect Forward Secrecy: If the long-term keys of
communicating entities are compromised, this will not
enable a malicious user to compromise previously gen-
erated session keys.
G11) Mutual Non-Repudiation: Communicating entities
will not be able to deny that they have executed a
protocol run with each other.
G12) Partial Chosen Key (PCK) Attack Resilience: Pro-
tocols that claim to provide joint key control are sus-
ceptible to this type of attack [32]. In this type of
attack, if two entities provide separate values to the key
generation function then one entity has to communicate
its contribution value to the other. The second entity
can then compute the value of its contribution in such
a way that it can dictate its strength (i.e. it is able to
generate a partially weak key). However, this attack
depends upon the computational capabilities of the
second entity. Therefore, proposed protocols should
adequately prevent PCK attack.
G13) Trust Assurance (Trustworthiness): The communi-
cating parties not only provide security and operation
assurance but also validation proofs that are dynami-
cally generated during the protocol execution.
G14) Denial-of-Service (DoS) Prevention: The protocol
should not require the individual nodes to allocate
a large set of resources to the extent that it might
contribute to a DoS attack.
G15) Privacy: A third party should not be able to know the
identities of the AWN nodes.
For a formal definition of the terms (italicized) used in
the above list, the reader is referred to [33]. The require-
ments listed above are later used as a point of reference to
compare the selected protocols in Table 3.
For the performance evaluation that we have conducted,
the main measurements are related to the time required
to establish a secure channel once the wireless link is
established and they are discussed in section 5.3.
4.2. Protocol Notation
The notations used in the protocol description are listed
in Table 2;
4.3. Pre-Protocol Setup
The proposed protocol requires certain pre-protocol
setup operations as listed below:
1) Each aircraft device that is part of the AWN has a TPM.
2) Each device in the AWN is pre-configured with the sig-
nature verification keys of its communication partners
(i.e. public keys of other aircraft devices).
3) Each device is also pre-configured with the signature
verification keys of the TPMs of its communication
partners (i.e. the public key corresponding to the AIK
key used to sign the PCR values stored in the TPM)
along with their own trusted and secure PCR values
(i.e. the values for their trusted and secure state).
4.4. Proposed Protocol
The messages of the protocol are listed in Table 1 and
described below.
Message 1. The AD1 generates a random number
NAD1 and computes the Diffie-Hellman exponential grAD1 .
The “H(grAD1‖NAD1‖AD1i‖AD2i)” serves as a session
cookie “SCookie”, and it is appended to each subsequent
message sent by both devices. It indicates the session in-
formation, facilitates protection against DoS attacks and
(possibly) provides the protocol session resumption facility,
which is required if a protocol run is interrupted before it
successfully concludes. Finally, AD1 will request AD2 to
provide assurance of its current state.
Message 2. In response, AD2 generates a random
number, and a Diffie-Hellman exponential grAD2 . It can
then calculate the kDH = (grAD1)rAD2 (mod n) which
will be the shared secret from which the rest of the
keys will be generated. The encryption key is generated
as Ke = HkDH (NAD1‖NAD2‖′′1′′) and a MAC key as
Ka = HkDH (NAD1‖NAD2‖′′2′′). We can further generate
(session) keys in a similar manner for data stream-specific
virtual links3 (VLs) for managing the communication be-
tween different aircraft sub-systems.
3. Virtual Links (VLs): Each communication relationship in an aircraft
network is represented as a VL. In our proposal we assume that a pair of
communication parties would have two uni-directional VLs and each VL
will have its own session key.
Subsequently, the TPM generates a state validation mes-
sage signed by the TPM AIK key represented in the protocol
as “SignTPMAD2(AD2 − V alidation)”. AD2 will also
request AD1 to provide assurance of its current state.
On receipt of this message, AD1 will first generate the
session keys. AD1 will then verify AD2’s signature and
validation proof generated by the TPM of AD2. As the sig-
nature key belongs to the TPM of AD2, an attacker cannot
masquerade this signature. By verifying the signature, AD1
can ascertain the current state (PCR value) is measured by
the TPM of AD2. Now AD1 can verify whether the PCR
value represents a trusted and secure state or not. Since our
protocol pre-setup AD1 would have the PCR value of a
trusted and secure state of AD2.
Furthermore, AD1 will check the values of Diffie-
Hellman exponentials (i.e. grAD1 and grAD2) and of the
generated random numbers to avoid main-in-the-middle and
replay attacks.
Message 3. AD1 will then generate a message sim-
ilar to message 2, a signature by AD1 and trust validation
proof generated by its TPM.
On receipt of the message, AD2 will verify the trust
validation proof and generate keys. Furthermore, AD2 will
also check the values of the Diffie-Hellman exponentials
and of the generated random numbers to avoid man-in-the-
middle and replay attacks.
4.5. Post-Protocol Process
The shared material generated from the Diffie-Hellman
exponential can be used to generate more keys than just the
session encryption and MAC keys of the protocol. If this
is not desirable then session encryption and MAC keys can
be saved as master session keys. Individual VL keys can
then be generated from these session keys. Based on the
security policies related to the VLs, whether they require
only confidentiality or integrity or both, these two master
session keys can be used to generate VL specific encryption
and MAC keys.
4.6. Protocol Resumption
As discussed in [3], secure channel protocols only run
when an aircraft is stationary on the ground, with proofs that
the aircraft is not in flight based on geo-location, proximity
to airport, weight on wheels, etc. The proposed protocol
would run before each flight and master session keys are
only valid for a single flight. The protocol should not be
executed during the flight. Therefore, if a device has to reset
due to some unforeseeable situation, a safety procedure to
resume the secure channel and all of the associated VL keys
- without running the protocol - must exist. For this purpose,
each individual device will save the master session keys in
its persistent storage and will have a standard algorithm to
generate the keys for each of the VLs. If the master session
keys are lost, then, during that particular flight, the device
would be out of communication. To avoid this, the master
session keys should be stored on two different memories
Table 1. SECURE AND TRUSTED CHANNEL PROTOCOL (STCP).
1. AD1→ AD2 : AD1i‖AD2i‖NAD1‖grAD1‖V RAD1−AD2‖SCookie
2. AD2→ AD1 : AD2i‖AD1i‖NAD2‖grAD2‖[SignAD2(AD2−Data)‖SignTPMAD2 (AD2− V alidation)]KeKa‖V RAD2−AD1‖SCookie
: AD2−Data = H(AD2i‖AD1i‖grAD1‖grAD2‖NAD1‖NAD2)
: AD2− V alidation = SASAD2−AD1‖NAD1‖NAD2
3. AD1→ AD2 : [SignAD1(AD1−Data)‖SignTPMAD1 (AD1− V alidation)]KeKa‖SCookie
: AD1−Data = H(AD1i‖AD2i‖grAD2‖grAD1‖NAD2‖NAD1)
: AD1− V alidation = SASAD1−AD2‖NAD2‖NAD1
Table 2. NOTATION USED IN PROTOCOL DESCRIPTION.
AD1 : Denotes an aircraft device ’1’.
AD2 : Denotes an aircraft device ’2’.
A→ B : Message sent by an entity A to an entity B.
TPMX : Denotes a TPM of an entity X
Xi : Represents the identity of an entity X .
grX : Diffie-Hellman exponential generated by an entity X .
NX : Random number generated by an entity X .
X‖Y : Represents the concatenation of the data items X, Y
in the given order.
[M ]KeKa : Message M is encrypted by the session encryption
key Ke and then MAC is computed using the session
MAC key Ka. Both keys Ke and Ka are generated
during the protocol run.
SignX(Z) : Signature generated on data Z by the entity X using
a signature algorithm [34].
H(Z) : Is the result of generating a hash of data Z.
Hk(Z) : Result of generating a keyed hash of data Z using key
k.
SCookie : Session cookie generated by one of the communica-
tion entities. It indicates the session information and
facilitates protection against DoS attacks along with
(possibly) providing the protocol session resumption
facility.
V RA−B : Validation request sent by entity A to entity B. In
response entity B provides a security and reliability
assurance to entity A.
SASA−B : Security assurance (PCR values) generation by entity
A that provides trust validation to the requesting
entity B.
(each aircraft device has at least two separate storage media,
so as to provide this dual storage redundancy).
5. Protocol Evaluation
In this section, we first discuss the information analysis
of the protocols, and then compare different protocols with
our proposal based on the comparison criteria defined above.
Finally, we provide some implementation results and a
formal analysis using CasperFDR.
5.1. Brief Information Analysis
Throughout this section, we refer to the protocol com-
parison criteria of section 4.1 by their respective numbers
as listed in the same section.
During the proposed protocol, in messages 2 and 3
the communicating entities authenticate each other, which
satisfies G1. Similarly, for G2, all communicating entities
have exchanged cryptographic certificates to facilitate an
authentication and trust validation proof (generated and
signed by the TPM) before the aircraft devices are deployed
(pre-deployment configuration).
The proposed protocol satisfies requirements G3, G4,
G5 and G12 by first requiring AD1 and AD2 to generate
the Diffie-Hellman exponential; thus computational cost is
equal on both sides. Similarly, exponential generation also
assures that both devices will have equal input to the key
generation. Messages 2 and 3 are encrypted used the keys
generated during the protocol, thus providing mutual key
confirmation (satisfying G6).
In the proposed protocol, session keys generated in one
session have no link with the session keys generated in
other sessions, even when the session is established between
the same devices. This enables the protocol to provide re-
silience against known-key security (G7). This unlinkability
of session keys is based on the fact that each entity not
only generates a new Diffie-Hellman exponential but also a
random number, both of which are used during the protocol
for key generation. Therefore, even if an adversary “A”
finds out about the exponential and random numbers of a
particular session, it will not enable him to generate past or
future session keys.
Furthermore, to provide unknown key share resilience
(G8), the proposed protocol includes the Diffie-Hellman
exponentials along with generated random numbers and
each communicating entity then signs them. Therefore, the
receiving entity can then ascertain the identity of the entity
with which it has shared the key.
The protocol can be considered to be a KCI-resilient
(G9) protocol, as protection against the KCI is based on the
digital signatures. In addition, the cryptographic certificates
of each signature key also include its association with a
particular device. Therefore, if A has knowledge of the
signature key of a device, it can only masquerade this
particular device to other devices but not others to it.
The proposed protocol also meets the requirement for
perfect forward secrecy (G10) by making the key generation
process independent of any long-term keys. The session keys
are generated using fresh values of Diffie-Hellman exponen-
tials and random numbers, regardless of the long term keys:
they are signature keys. Therefore, even if eventuallyA finds
out the signature key of any entity it will not enable him
to determine past session keys. This independence of long
term secrets from the session key generation process also
enables the protocol to satisfy G7.
Communicating entities in the STCP share signed mes-
Table 3. PROTOCOL COMPARISON ON THE BASIS OF THE STATED GOALS (SEE SECTION 4.1.)
Goals ProtocolsSTS AD ASPeCT JFK T2LS SCP81 MM SM Asymmetric TKDF P-STCP SSH SSL Proposed Protocol
G1. ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ −∗ −∗ ∗ ∗ (∗) ∗ ∗
G2. ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ −∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗
G3. ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ −∗ −∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗
G4. ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ (∗) ∗ −∗ ∗ (∗) (∗) ∗
G5. ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ −∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗
G6. ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ −∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗
G7. ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗
G8. ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ −∗ −∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗
G9. ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗
G10. ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗
G11. ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗
G12. (∗) (∗) (∗) (∗) (∗) (∗) ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗
G13. (∗) (∗) ∗ −∗ ∗ (∗) (∗) ∗
G14. ∗ (∗) ∗ (∗) (∗) ∗
G15. (∗) ∗ ∗ (∗) (∗) ∗ (∗) (∗) ∗
Note: ∗ means that the protocol meets the stated goal, (∗) shows that the protocol can be modified to satisfy the requirement, and −∗ means that the
protocol (implicitly) meets the requirement not because of the protocol messages but because of the prior relationship between the communicating entities.
sages with each other that include the session informa-
tion, thus providing mutual non-repudiation (G11). G14 is
ensured by the inclusion in the protocol of the session
cookie, which provides a limited protection against DoS, and
by the fact that individual devices have pre-configurations
of communication partners which enable them to drop a
connection if an entity trying to connect with them is not
able to authenticate.
To satisfy G15, the device identities are basically a
random string that should not have any link with the function
of the device. This would hinder an attacker from eaves-
dropping a protocol run to determine which aircraft device
is communicating on the wireless channel.
Finally, TPMs on all communicating devices provide
trust validation proof in the form of PCR values signed by
the TPM AIK. This provides mutual validation of the trust
between communicating devices, confirming that the other
device is functioning in a secure and reliable state (G13).
5.2. Revisiting the Requirements and Goals
Table 3 provides a comparison between the listed pro-
tocols in section 2.3 with the proposed protocol in terms of
the required goals (see section 4.1).
As shown in Table 3, the STS protocol meets the first
eleven goals. The main issue with the STS protocol is
that it does not provide adequate protection against partial
chosen key attacks (G12) and privacy protection (G15). The
remaining goals are not met by the STS because of the
design architecture and deployment environment, which did
not require these goals. Similarly, the AD protocol does not
meet G6, G10 and G13-G15.
The ASPeCT and JFK protocols meet a large set of
goals. Both of these protocols can be easily modified to
provide trust assurance (requiring additional signatures).
Both of these protocols are vulnerable to partial chosen key
attacks. However, in Table 3 we opt for the possibility that
the ASPeCT and JFK protocols can be modified to meet
this goal because in an AWN all communicating devices
may be of the same computation power and have a strong
offline pre-deployment relationship.
The T2LS protocol meets the trust assurance goal by
default. However, for the remaining goals it has the same
results as the SSL protocol. A point in favour of the SCP81,
MM, and SM protocols is that they were designed for the
smart card industry where there is a strong and centralised
organisational model. Most of these protocols, to some ex-
tent, have a similar architecture, in which a server generates
the key and then communicates that key to the client. There
is no non-repudiation as they do not use signatures in the
protocol run.
Both SSH and SSL meet a large set of requirements
and also have the potential to be extended to the additional
requirements. However, to provide a flexible, backward
compatible and universally acceptable architecture these
protocols have too many optional parameters. Such flexi-
bility is one of the main causes of most of the issues that
these protocols have been plagued with in the last couple of
years, heartbleed being the most infamous vulnerability.
Asymmetric TKDF (Trusted Key Distribution Frame-
works) does not satisfy a number of requirements. In con-
trast, P-STCP satisfies most of the requirements listed in
the table. The only difference between the P-STCP and
the proposed protocol (except for the message structure) is
the number of rounds to successfully complete a protocols
run. P-SCTP has four messages (2-round protocol) and the
proposed protocol uses 3 messages (1.5-round protocol).
As apparent from the table 3, the proposed protocol
satisfies all goals that were described in section 4.1.
5.3. Practical Implementation
In our AWN test-bed each node is a Raspberry Pi model
B supplied with a Wi-Fi USB dongle TL-WN722N by TP-
LINK. In all the measurements we made, the nodes were
configured in ad-hoc mode.
For all the selected protocols, in our evaluation imple-
mentations, we setup two neighboring nodes to establish a
secure channel. This provides a performance measurement
of the protocols between individual communicating pairs.
However for the TKDF, a key distribution server is also
required and a third node in the ad-hoc network plays this
role.
Backend platform for measurements
Server
Ethernet 
switch
Ethernet wire
Raspberry Pi equipped 
with a Wi-Fi USB dongle
Secure Channel Protocol
Avionics Wireless Network
Wi-Fi 
eavesdropping
Figure 2. AWN test-bed
In our AWN test-bed, each node is connected to a
backend server by means of an Ethernet connection. This
server controls the nodes so as to prepare them for the target
scenario and is also in charge of collecting the measure-
ments. Effective measurement can be done internally on the
node initiating the secure channel, called a client, and/or
it can be done at the level of the network data exchanged
between the nodes of the AWN and captured with a Wi-Fi
card on the backend server set in monitor mode.
The performance comparison is provided in Table 4,
comparing a subset of protocols from table 3 and proposed
protocol performance in the developed test-bed environment.
Table 4. PROTOCOL PERFORMANCE MEASURES (MILLISECONDS)
SSL SSH Asymmetric TKDF Proposed Protocol
1310.93 911.21 14447.63 4582.44
Note: Above-mentioned measurement values for SSL, SSH and
Asymmetric TKDF are from [38].
In our Python implementation of the proposed protocol,
the TPM was emulated by the Raspberry Pi. Key sizes used
for our proposed protocol were 2048 bits MODP group for
the Diffie-Hellman key generation, 2048 bits for RSA and
256 bits for symmetric encryption and MAC computation
(AES).
The P-STCP protocol was implemented with smaller key
sizes in [10], resulting in 2998.71ms performance measure-
ment. Use the key sizes from [10] in our implementation
results the performance of the proposed protocol to be
1201.50ms.
5.4. Protocol Verification by CasperFDR
We selected the CasperFDR approach for formal analy-
sis of the proposed protocol. The Casper compiler [35] takes
input as a high-level description of the protocol, together
with its security requirements along with the definition of
an attacker and its capabilities. The compiler then translates
the description into the process algebra of Communicating
Sequential Processes (CSP) [36]. The CSP description of
the protocol can be machine-verified using the Failures-
Divergence Refinement (FDR) model checker [37]. The
intruder’s capability modelled in the Casper script (appendix
A) for the proposed protocol is:
• an intruder can masquerade any entity in the network,
• an intruder can read the messages transmitted in the
network, and
• an intruder cannot influence the internal process of an
entity in the network.
The security specification for which CasperFDR evalu-
ates the network is as shown below. The listed specifications
are defined in the #Specification section of appendix A:
• the protocol run is fresh and both applications are alive,
• the key generated by the entity A is known only to the
entity B (A and B are communication partners/devices),
• entities mutually authenticate each other and have mu-
tual key assurance at the conclusion of the protocol,
• long-term keys of communicating entities are not com-
promised, and
• an intruder is unable to deduce the identities from
observing the protocol messages.
The CasperFDR tool evaluated the protocol and did not
find any feasible attack(s). The script is provided in appendix
A.
6. Conclusion and Future Research Directions
In this paper, we outlined the concept of the AWN and
discussed why such a proposal requires a secure channel
for communication. The data communicated over an AWN
has a strong requirement for confidentiality and integrity.
To satisfy this requirement, communicating devices should
have some cryptographic secrets to provide confidentiality
and integrity. To generate these cryptographic secrets, the
devices run a secure channel protocol. In this paper, we
proposed a secure channel protocol that not only provides
mutual authentications and key sharing between the com-
municating entities but also provides assurance that each of
the devices is in a secure and trusted state. We compared
our proposed protocol with a list of selected protocols and
experimental performance results were provided. Finally, we
evaluated the protocol using CasperFDR, showing that our
protocol is secure against a number of attacks.
In future work, we will explore the major issue of
detecting and neutralising wireless jamming and DoS attack-
ers, along with building a strong mitigating framework. In
addition to the trusted boot, for robust and reliable security
we need to look into secure execution on AWN nodes -
especially investigating the inclusion of ARM TrustZone and
Intel SGX technologies.
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Appendix A.
CasperFDR Script
#Free variables
datatype Field = Gen | Exp(Field, Num)
unwinding 2
hkAD2, hkAD1, iMsg, rMsg, EnMaKey : Field
AD1, AD2, U: Agent
gAD1, gAD2: Num
nAD1, nAD2, AD1Val, AD2Val: Nonce
VKey: Agent->PublicKey
SKey: Agent->SecretKey
InverseKeys = (VKey, SKey), (EnMaKey,
EnMaKey), (Gen, Gen), (Exp, Exp)
#Protocol description
0. -> AD2 : AD1 [AD1!=AD2] <iMsg :=
Exp(Gen,gAD2)>
1. AD2 -> AD1 : AD2, nAD2, iMsg%hkAD2
<EnMaKey := Exp(hkAD2, gAD1); rMsg :=
Exp(Gen,gAD1)>
2. AD1 -> AD2 : nAD1, rMsg%hkAD1 <EnMaKey :=
Exp(hkAD1, gAD2)>
3. AD2 -> AD1: nAD2, nAD1
4. AD1 -> AD2 : {{rMsg, U,
nAD2}{SKey(U)}}{EnMaKey} [rMsg==hkAD2]
5. AD2 -> AD1 : {{iMsg,AD2,
nAD1}{SKey(AD2)}}{EnMaKey} [iMsg==hkAD1]
6.AD1 -> AD2 : {{AD1OSHash, AD1,
nAD2}{SKey(AD1)}}{EnMaKey}
#Actual variables
ADev1, ADev2, ME: Agent
GAD1, GAD2, GMalicious: Num
NAD1, NAD2, AD1VAL, AD2VAL, NMalicious: Nonce
#Processes
INITIATOR(AD2,AD1, U, AD2VAL, gAD2,
nAD2)knows SKey(AD2), VKey
READ2ONDER(AD1,AD2, U, AD1VAL, gSC, nSC)
knows SKey(U), SKey(SC), VKey
#System
INITIATOR(ADev2, ADev1,ADev2Val, GAD2, NAD2)
READ2ONDER(ADev1, ADev2, ADev1Val, GAD1,
NAD1)
#Functions
symbolic VKey, SKey
#Intruder Information
Intruder = ME
IntruderKnowledge = {ADev2, ADev2, ME,
GMalicious, NMalicious, SKey(ME), VKey}
#Specification
Aliveness(AD2, AD1)
Aliveness(AD1, AD2)
Agreement(AD2, AD1, [EnMaKey])
Secret(AD2, EnMaKey, [AD1])
Secret(AD1, U, [AD2])
#Equivalences
forall x, y : Num . Exp(Exp(Gen, x), y) =
Exp(Exp(Gen, y), x)
